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Point of departure of this lecture will be the correspondence principle, i.e. the principle 
that the words of a sentence correspond, one by one, to the elements that constitute the 
situation described by that sentence. A full discussion of the historical background of 
this principle is not possible at this moment. For our present purposes it must suffice to 
state that the correspondence principle appears to have occupied the minds of all the 
best Indian thinkers for a number of centuries during the first millennium of the 
common era. 
 What is the problem with the correspondence principle? A simple example may 
explain this. In the case of a sentence like "John reads a book" it makes sense to assume 
that the situation described by this sentence contains someone called ‘John’, a book, and 
the activity of reading. The words of the sentence correspond, therefore, one by one to 
the elements that constitute the situation described. Put differently, the correspondence 
principle is valid here. It is not, and cannot be, valid in the sentence "John writes a 
book". The situation described by this last sentence, too, contains John and the activity 
of writing, but it does not contain the book. For the book is not yet finished. The same is 
true of sentences like "he makes a jar", or even "the jar comes into being". The 
situations described by these last two sentences do not contain the jar that is being 
made, or that comes into being. If it did, there would be no need to make the jar, or the 
jar would not have to come into being. 
 The correspondence principle clearly raises questions which it is not easy to 
answer as long as one holds on to it. Yet most [44] thinkers of the period under 
consideration appear to have accepted the principle. And many of them tried to deal 
with the problem of origination, which is the most obvious problem it evokes. Famous 
among them is the Buddhist thinker Någårjuna, who did not hesitate to conclude from 
the dilemma that nothing can come into being. Some followed him in this respect, even 
from among those who were not Buddhists. The ajåtivåda of Gau∂apåda is a famous 
example. Gau∂apåda is considered— at least by the later tradition; many questions 
surround the historical person or persons who composed the works attibuted to him — 
an early Vedånta author, the teacher of the teacher of Ía∫kara. 
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 Yet most thinkers were not all that keen to deny the possibility that things can 
come into being. They had to find other solutions. They all had to find something in the 
situation described by the sentence "the jar comes into being" / "he makes a jar", to 
which the word ‘jar’ could refer. Many chose the universal, sometimes along with other 
things, such as the individual. The universal ‘jar-ness’ being eternal, it is already there 
when the jar comes into being, or is made. Others maintained that the jar is present in its 
causes, and therefore already there in a way while it is being made. This second position 
is known by the term satkåryavåda "the position according to which the effect exists [in 
its causes]". I do not think that the satkåryavåda was created, or invented, in order to 
solve the difficulties connected with the correspondence principle, but its appeal grew 
inevitably once these difficulties attracted general attention. 
 But not everyone accepted the satkåryavåda. Some emphatically resisted it, 
preferring the asatkåryavåda "the position according to which the effect does not exist 
[in its causes]". The Vaiße∑ika school of philosophy accepts this position. 
 How did Vaiße∑ika deal with the difficulties connected with the correspondence 
principle? After what I have said so far, its reaction is almost predictable. Vaiße∑ika 
does not accept that the jar is already there before it comes into being; that solution to 
the problem is consequently not open to it. Its ontology, on the other hand, does allow 
for universals. One would therefore expect a solution of the kind that the word ‘jar’ 
denotes — perhaps along [45] with other things — the universal. The word ‘jar’ in "he 
makes a jar" will have something to refer to, and the problem would be solved. 
 It is true that from a certain date onward Vaiße∑ika authors opt for this solution. 
The Padårthadharmasa∫graha, or Praßastapådabhå∑ya, does not however touch this 
problem, and nor does the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. Since we have practically no other texts for 
the early period, one might be tempted to conclude that Vaiße∑ika authors have chosen 
this solution right from the time they became aware of the problem of origination. This 
position will however have to be modified in the light of some of the Vaiße∑ika points 
of view that have been preserved for us in the works of non-Vaiße∑ika authors, which 
inform us about the period before the Padårthadharmasa∫graha. 
 Consider to begin with a passage from the Vibhå∑åprabhåv®tti, a commentary on 
the Abhidharmad¥pa, a text of the Buddhist Sarvåstivåda school. It attributes the 
following position to the Vaiße∑ikas:1 
 
                                                
1 Abhidh-d ad kårikå 310, p. 274 l. 5-7: vaiße∑iko manyate: kapåle∑v avidyamånaµ gha†adravyaµ tantu∑u 
cåvidyamånaµ pa†adravyaµ kapålatantusaµyogåd utpadyate/ gauˆyå ca kalpanayå viprak®tåvasthåvi∑ayå 
janikart®sattå vyapadißyata iti/. Le mot viprak®ta est obscur. The editor, Padmanabh S. Jaini, suggests an 
emendation into viprak®∑†a ‘distant’, but this does not improve much. Apte's dictionary gives viprak®ta, 
among other meanings, the sens ‘opposed’ which seems to fit more or less both here and two lines further 
down where the word is used a second time. 
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The Vaiße∑ika thinks [as follows]: The substance ‘jar’, which is not present in 
the potsherds [out of which it will be constituted], and the substance ‘cloth’, 
which is not present in the threads [out of which it will be constituted], come 
into being as a result of the contact between the potsherds and that of the threads 
[respectively]. And through secondary thought (gauˆyå kalpanayå) one speaks 
of the existence of the agent of coming into being, [existence] which has as 
object a state [of the jar] which is opposite [to the present]. 
[46] 
Mysterious as this passage is, it states quite clearly that the jar exists prior to its coming 
into being, thanks to a secondary thought. No further details are provided. 
 If this passage has whetted our appetite, a discussion in the Dvådaßåranayacakra 
of Mallavådin, and in its commentary the Nyåyågamånusåriˆ¥ of SiµhasËri will give us 
further material to think about. We learn here that in Vaiße∑ika things that have come 
into being are called ‘existing’ because of a connection with the universal ‘existence’ 
(sattåsambandha). This connection with the universal ‘existence’ takes place at the 
moment of, or immediately after, their coming into being; it is the reason of the 
denomination and of the idea of the things concerned.2  
 Here the following question arises: Are objects completely non-existent before 
this connection with existence take place? According to Mallavådin, the Vaiße∑ikas give 
a negative answer to this question. Things do exist in a certain way before they come 
into being. True, they have no connection with existence at that moment, but they have 
some kind of essence (astitva, svabhåva, svabhåvasattå), which allows them to come 
into being. This means that even without connection with existence, a substance (or, for 
that matter, a quality or a movement) has an identity. The Vaiße∑ika, according to 
Mallavådin, goes to the extent of reinterpreting the expression asat, which normally 
means ‘non-existent’. The Vaiße∑ika takes it as a bahuvr¥hi compound, and interprets it 
to mean "that which does not have existence". The expression asatkåryavåda, seen this 
way, does not say that the effect is not there before it comes into being; it only says that 
is has no connection with the universal ‘existence’ as yet.3 
[47] 
 The main discussion takes place in the seventh chapter (lit. spoke, ara) of the 
Dvådaßåranayacakra. The asatkåryavåda of Vaiße∑ika is attacked right from the very 
first line:4 "If the effect is not present [in its causes], it would not come into being, for 
there would be no agent of the operation [of coming into being] at hand, just as [in the 
case of] a sky-flower. Or [alternatively,] also a sky-flower would come into being, 
                                                
2 DNC vol. 2, p. 459 l. 8-9: ... sattåsambandho 'bhidhånapratyayahetu˙. 
3 DNC vol. 2, p. 462 l. 3-5: nanu asat ity atra naña uttarapadåbhidheyanivåraˆårthatvåt 
satprati∑edhårthatvåt katham asya såtmakatvam? na, anekåntåt, aputrabråhmaˆavad aguˆaguˆavat/ yathå 
nåsya putro 'st¥ty aputro bråhmaˆa˙ nåsya guˆo 'st¥ty aguˆo guˆa˙ tathehåpi nåsya sad ity asat/; cp. 
SiµhasËri, DNC p. 460 l. 10-11. 
4 DNC vol. 2, p. 455 l. 1-2: yady asat kåryaµ notpadyeta asannihitabhavit®katvåt khapu∑pavat/ 
khapu∑pam api votpadyeta asannihitabhavit®katvåt kåryavat/ 
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because there would be no agent of the operation [of coming into being] at hand, just as 
[in the case of] an effect." 
 This is, of course, the familiar problem, which is based on the correspondence 
principle. The Vaiße∑ika recognizes the problem, and maintains that the effect does not 
exist before it comes into being. However, there are two kinds of existence. The effect 
has no connection with the universal ‘existence’ (sattå) before it comes into being; but it 
is there, in a certain way — it has astitva. This is why the Vaiße∑ika answers:5 "Unlike 
the sky-flower, the effect, having come into being through its own astitva, becomes, 
even without the relationship of inherence with [the universal ‘existence’], a support 
[for that universal]." 
 The opponent of the Vaiße∑ika then raises the question whether existence (sattå) 
makes existent that which exists, or that which does not exist, or that which exists and 
does not exist.6 It is here that the Vaiße∑ika observes that one can deny that substances 
etc. have a connection with existence, but not their existence [48] through their own 
form; the universal ‘existence’ does not, therefore make inexistent things existent.7 
 I will not bother you with all the passage in this long discussion that concern the 
state of a thing before it is connected with existence. I must however cite the following 
sentence, which Mallavådin ascribes to the Vaiße∑ika:8 "And the [object which is asat] 
is not[, for that matter,] without identity, like a hare's horn. Even without connection 
with sattå, it is in our system like in another one, where pradhåna etc. have an identity." 
Elsewhere in the discussion the Vaiße∑ika recalls that såmånya, viße∑a and samavåya — 
all Vaiße∑ika categories — exist without having connection with sattå. But the 
comparison with the pradhåna of Såµkhya — for there can be no doubt that a 
comparison with the Såµkhya system of philosophy is made here — is stunning. For 
Såµkhya adheres to the satkåryavåda, and is therefore in many ways the exact opposite 
of Vaiße∑ika with its asatkåryavåda. The comparison shows that the Vaiße∑ikas to 
whose writings Mallavådin had access came dangerously close to the position of the 
Såµkhyas where they tried to solve the problem of origination. 
 
 A very important question remains to be discussed. If the Vaiße∑ikas maintained 
that things exist in a certain way before they come into being, can one determine the 
beginning of this half-existence? Are they there from beginningless time, as the 
                                                
5 DNC vol. 2, p. 456 l. 1-2: ... åßrayisamavåyåd ®te 'pi kåryaµ svenaivåstitvenotpannam åßrayo bhavati 
khapu∑pavaidharmyeˆa ... 
6 DNC vol. 2, p. 459 l. 1-2: iha pråk sattåsambandhåt satåµ vå asatåµ vå sadasatåµ vå dravyåd¥nåµ 
satkar¥ sattå?. Similar criticism in the Madhyamakah®dayakårikå and Tarkajvålå of Bhåvaviveka; see 
Tachikawa, 1994: 898. 
7 DNC vol. 2, p. 460 l. 1-2: ... dravyåd¥nåµ sattåsambandha˙ prati∑idhyate na tu svarËpasadbhåva iti sattå 
naivåsatåµ satkar¥. 
8 DNC vol. 2, p. 462 l. 6-7: na ca tad api niråtmakaµ ßaßavi∑åˆavat, sattåsambandhåd ®te 'pi yathå 
parapak∑e pradhånåd¥nåµ såtmakatvaµ tathehåpi syåt. 
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Såµkhyas believed? To my knowledge Mallavådin and SiµhasËri's discussions offer no 
answer to this question. We may find the answer in another early text, the Yuktid¥pikå, 
which comments upon the Såµkhyakårikå. Around kårikå 9 this text contains a 
discussion with a Vaiße∑ika on the satkåryavåda. Where it presents the argument that 
one cannot make something [49] that is not there — an argument which we are familiar 
with — it puts the following words in the mouth of the Vaiße∑ika:9 "But the effect is 
made by the agent etc. in the intermediate time. Which is this intermediate time? The 
answer is (follows a verse): They call ‘intermediate time’ the time during which the 
causes have started to do the work, until the production of the effect." 
 I conclude, be it with much caution, that the preexistence of something that is 
going to come into being is not without beginning. This passage from the Yuktid¥pikå 
suggests rather that this preexistence starts when the different factors that contribute to 
produce the effect, i.e., to make the jar, start fulfilling their various functions. The 
intermediate time is neither without beginning, nor momentary. 
 
Two questions remain to be asked in connection with the preceding observations. First 
of all, what is in general the relationship between words and things in Vaiße∑ika? Since 
the correspondence principle presupposes a close link between the words of a sentence 
and the elements that constitute the situation it describes, this question is of some 
importance. The second question to be asked concerns the literature of Vaiße∑ika in 
which the positions just described were originally expressed. 
 First the relationship between words and things. In a recent article I have argued 
that Vaiße∑ika is to a large extent based on four axioms.10 Two of these axioms are of 
special interest in the present context. In Vaiße∑ika composite objects are looked upon 
as real, as real as their constituents, and as existing alongside them. The vase is 
different from the two halves that it is composed [50] of; together they constitute three 
entities. The Vaiße∑ikas, moreover, present a list of categories which constitutes, in 
their opinion, a list of all there is. The question is: how could the Vaiße∑ikas find out 
what filled their world? 
 Their answer is directly relevant to the theme of this lecture. It is: the Sanskrit 
language. The Sanskrit language allowed them to find out what exists. Words are for 
them the key that gives access to reality. This they explain by pointing out that names 
                                                
9 YD p. 52 l. 16-21: åha, nanu ca madhyame kåle kartrådibhi˙ kåryaµ kriyate/ ka˙ punar asau 
madhyama˙ kåla iti? åha: 
 årambhåya pras®tå yasmin kåle bhavanti kartåra˙/ 
 kåryasyåni∑pådåt taµ madhyamaµ kålam icchanti// iti 
yadå hetava˙ prav®ttårambhå bhavanty uddißya kåryaµ na ca tåvan naimittikasyåtmalåbha˙ saµvartate sa 
madhyama˙ kåla˙/ tasmin kriyate kårakai˙ kåryam iti/. Cp. Motegi, 1994: 815 sq.; Motegi draws 
attention to the fact that the reading kåryasyåni∑pådåt in the verse is an emendation which deviates from 
the manuscripts. 
10 Bronkhorst, 1992. 
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were given by seers who could perceive everything.11 This in its turn [51] explains why 
the Vaiße∑ika texts frequently emphasise that this or that ontological situation justifies 
this or that current expression. The quality p®thaktva (separateness), for example, 
explains that people speak of distinction. Sometimes the reasoning works in the 
opposite direction: the fact that the personal pronoun "I" cannot be used in apposition 
with some such term as "earth", proves that the soul is different from the body. Many 
further examples could be adduced to illustrate the parallelism between words and 
things from the Vaiße∑ika point of view, but they tend to be rather technical; I will not, 
therefore, harass you with more of them.12 But I would like to add one more 
observation: even though the texts are not explicit about this, the conscious belief in the 
intimate connection between words and things may explain why the three most 
important (and perhaps oldest) categories of Vaiße∑ika — substance (dravya), quality 
(guˆa) and movement (karman) — correspond to the three main types of words: nouns, 
adjectives and verbs. 
 These considerations show that Vaiße∑ika takes a close connection between 
words and things for granted. This makes it all the more understandable that the 
principle of correspondence exerted a strong attraction on them. 
 We now turn to the other remaining question. Which were the Vaiße∑ika texts in 
which the positions outlined above found expression? 
 The oldest clearly understandable and unitary Vaiße∑ika text which we possess is 
the Padårthadharmasa∫graha of Praßastapåda, which I mentioned earlier. I am tempted 
to believe that this text belongs to the sixth century of the common era, and I have the 
                                                
11 Vaiße∑ika SËtra (ed. Jambuvijaya) 2.1.18-19: saµjñåkarma tv asmadvißi∑†ånåµ li∫gam/ 
pratyak∑apËrvakatvåt saµjñåkarmaˆa˙/. See also Wezler, 1985. The theme of seers who have given 
names to things is already present in the Ùgveda and other early texts, as we have seen. Other texts take 
over the same theme. The Yuktid¥pikå (ed. Pandeya, p. 5 l. 9 f.) ascribes the original function of naming 
things to the supreme seer (paramar∑i), who is, of course, Kapila. The Mahåbhårata (12.262.8), probably 
inspired by the Nirukta passage cited earlier, states that the seer Kapila had an an insight into the nature 
of things (pratyak∑adharma); the Mahåbhå∑ya (ed. Kielhorn vol. I p. 11 l. 11 f.) uses the same expression 
(here pratyak∑adharman) in connection with seers known as yarvåˆas tarvåˆas (so Cardona, 1990: 7 and 
16 n. 24). The Nyåya Bhå∑ya use the same expression as the Nirukta (såk∑åtk®tadharman) with reference 
to "reliable persons" (åpta); see Franco, 1994: 241. See further Ruegg, 1994, 1994a; also Bhart®hari's 
Våkyapad¥ya 1.37-38; 3.1.46; Houben, forthcoming b. Isaacson, 1993, has drawn attention to the fact that 
yogic perception has played a role in Vaiße∑ika from an early date onward. The idea that poets have a 
special insight into the nature of things was to have a long life in India. Råjaßekhara, the author of the 
treatise on poetry called Kåvyam¥måµså (9th or 10th century C.E.), observes in chapter 12 (p. 62, l. 17 - 
p. 63, l. 1; tr. Granoff, 1995: 364): "The true poetic eye, gained from propitiation of the goddess 
Sarasvat¥, without need of external aids reveals things that have been directly experienced by the poet and 
things that the poet has never even experienced before, in a process that is beyond the range of human 
conception and cannot be described in words. For it is said that the goddess Sarasvat¥ reveals even to the 
sleeping poet both the theme of his poem and the language in which to express it. But others though 
awake are as if blind. For this reason it is said that really great poets are blind to things that have already 
been seen by others, but possess a kind of divine sight that enables them to perceive that which no one 
before them has ever seen. Even the Three-eyed God Íiva or Indra with his thousand eyes cannot see that 
which mortal poets see with their ordinary eyes. In the mirror that is the mind of poets the whole universe 
is reflected. Words and what they express vie with each other in their rush to be present to great minded 
poets. Poets explore with their words that which yogins see through the power of their religious 
accomplishments. And so the words of great poets are potentially infinite." 
12 See Bronkhorst, 1992: 99 f., for these and other examples. 
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impression that most researchers would more or less agree with this date. Besides the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha we have a short text, that has only survived in Chinese 
translation, and which may have been called Daßapadårth¥; it is unfortunately too short 
to derive much information from it. And then there is, of course, the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. 
The Vaiße∑ika SËtra is the oldest [52] Vaiße∑ika text we possess, and I am tempted to 
think that it is the earliest Vaiße∑ika text that ever existed. It, or rather its earliest 
version, must date back to the early centuries of the common era, for Vaiße∑ika is 
already referred to in the Buddhist Vibhå∑å.13 Unfortunately the Vaiße∑ika SËtra which 
is known to us is not identical with its earliest version. Five versions have been 
preserved,14 all of which share features that belong to a time well after the beginning of 
the system. SËtras have been added and removed, and even the order of the sËtras 
appears to have occasionally been changed so as to allow of a different interpretation.15 
 It is not clear until what date modifications were still introduced into the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra. Certain is that a long time separates the earliest version of this text 
from the Padårthadharmasa∫graha. And it is also becoming more and more clear that 
during this period much happened to the system. The sËtra that enumerates qualities, for 
example, has just seventeen of them. The Padårthadharmasa∫graha, on the other hand, 
enumerates twenty-four qualities. Among the added qualities we find sound, and there 
is indeed evidence that early Vaiße∑ika looked upon sound, not as a quality, but as a 
substance, a form of wind.16 Another example concerns the creator god: the Vaiße∑ika 
SËtra contains no trace of a creator god, in the Padårthasa∫graha he has assumed his 
position. We even have the evidence from the Yuktid¥pikå and from the Vedåntin 
philosopher Ía∫kara to the extent that early Vaiße∑ika did not accept a creator god, 
whereas later thinkers of the school did. 
 Most of these changes were not introduced into the system by Praßastapåda. The 
idea of a creator god may be an exception; here there is some reason to assume that 
Praßastapåda himself [53] may have played a crucial role.17 Most of the other 
developments must have found their earliest expression in a number of texts that have 
existed during the long time that separates the original Vaiße∑ika SËtra from the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha. Of most of these texts even the names will probably forever 
remain unknown to us. About a few of them, however, we have some little information. 
One is a commentary written by Praßastapåda, the author of the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha. The other is the one on which he wrote a commentary, and 
                                                
13 Ui, 1917: 38 f. 
14 Three versions were known, accompanied by the commentaries of Candrånanda, Bha††a Vad¥ndra and 
Ía∫kara Mißra respectively; two more have been brought to light in Harunaga Isaacson's recent doctoral 
dissertation (1995). 
15 See Bronkhorst, 1995. 
16 Bronkhorst, 1993a. 
17 Bronkhorst, 1996. 
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which appeared to have been well-known in its time. By collecting the various 
testimonies in the texts of other schools, I have come to think that this text was called 
Ka†and¥, and that its author was known by the name Råvaˆa. The Ka†and¥ was itself a 
commentary, on the Vaiße∑ika SËtra, and it was written in the so-called vårttika-style, 
which explains that we sometimes find references to våkyas and bhå∑yas; the vårttika-
style is characterised by the presence of short nominal våkyas followed by somewhat 
more elaborate explanations called bhå∑yas.18 
 This Ka†and¥ (or whatever may have been its name) appears to have been an 
authoritative text for quite some time. It is indeed the text to which Mallavådin 
constantly refers while describing and criticizing the Vaiße∑ika position. It seems likely 
that also the other texts we have referred to — the Buddhist Vibhå∑åprabhåv®tti and the 
Såµkhya Yuktid¥pikå — based their information concerning Vaiße∑ika on this text. 
However this may be, it seems probable that the problem of origination did not play 
much of a role, if any, during the time of composition of the original Vaiße∑ika SËtra, 
and that it came up at a later time, perhaps for the first time in the Ka†and¥, or already 
before this text. 
 I have already pointed out to you that later Vaiße∑ika came to adopt a solution to 
the problem of origination that was quite different from the one offered (if I am right) in 
the Ka†and¥. Later Vaiße∑ikas joined the Naiyåyikas in thinking that the fact that words 
refer to universals solved that problem. Once this solution accepted, the complicated 
distinction between two forms of [54] existence, and the attempt to use it to answer the 
question of how something can come into being, became superfluous, and the 
weaknesses of the earlier solution, such as its vagueness (when exactly does the pre-
existence of a jar begin?), could not but contribute to its decline. The earlier solution 
was not just refuted, worse, it was forgotten, and no one talked about it any more. I do 
not exclude that this change of position of the Vaiße∑ika thinkers is responsible for the 
fact that the Ka†and¥ and its commentary by Praßastapåda, once the main works of the 
school, soon stopped to be handed down. Praßastapåda's Padårthadharmasa∫graha, on 
the other hand, does not touch the question of origination; is this the reason that it 
continued to be handed down in a fairly large number of manuscript copies until today? 
It is hard to prove these suspicions, but I would like to suggest, in conclusion, that the 
loss of philosophical texts may in certain cases have been occasioned by the fact that 





                                                
18 Bronkhorst, 1993. 
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